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Abstract
We introduce financial constraints in a theoretical analysis of illegal immigration. Interme-
diaries finance the migration costs of wealth-constrained migrants, who enter temporary
servitude contracts to repay the debt. These debt/labor contracts are easier to enforce
in the illegal than in the legal sector of the host country. Hence, when moving from the
illegal to the legal sector becomes more costly, for instance, because of stricter deportation
policies, fewer immigrants default on debt. This reduces the risks for intermediaries, who
are then more willing to finance illegal migration. Stricter deportation policies may thus,
ex ante, increase rather than decrease the flow of illegal migrants. Furthermore, stricter
deportation policies worsen the skill composition of immigrants. While stricter border
controls decrease overall immigration, they may result in an increase of debt-financed
migration. We also show that there are complementarities between employer sanctions
and deportation policies. We use available evidence to check the empirical consistency of
the theory.
Keywords: Illegal migration, wealth constraints, indentured servitude, financial con-
tracting
JEL Classification Codes: J61, K42, O17
1 Introduction
Illegal migration is a problem of growing scale and importance. The most conservative
estimates (Skeldon, 2000) amount to a worldwide stock of irregular migrants exceeding
10 million. The International Organization for Migration believes that half of all new
entrants into developed economies are illegal (IOM, 2003). According to the United
Kingdom Home Department, 75% of illegal migrants use the expensive services of smug-
glers (see IOM, 2003, page 63). Migrants and their families often cannot self-finance costs
that commonly reach several tens of thousands of US dollars. Hence, migrants endebt
themselves. Smugglers and other intermediaries finance the costs of undocumented entry,
and the debt repayment is taken out of migrants’ wages in sweatshops and restaurants
that are related to these intermediaries (Chin, 1999, IOM, 2000).
Owing to its multi-billion USD size (Kyle and Koslowski, 2001) and its inhumane
nature, human smuggling causes much concern in public opinion. Given increasing inter-
national wage differentials, unstable political circumstances and the importance of finan-
cial constraints in most source countries of migration, the demand for human smuggling
services may rise further. It is therefore important to consider the interactions between
wealth-constrained migrants and intermediaries in an economic theory of illegal migration.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first attempt to carry out such analysis.
There are three types of policies against illegal immigration: (i) border controls, (ii)
deportation and legalization policies, and (iii) work-site inspections, raids and sanctions
against employers of illegal immigrants. In our basic theory, we focus on the first two
policies, and study the third type of policies in an extended model (Section 7). In Ethier’s
(1986) model on illegal migration and other papers building on his work, all these policies
have similar, negative effects on illegal immigration. The effect of border controls in our
framework is similar to the literature, but the effect of stricter deportation policies differs
substantially. In our model, stricter deportation policies increase rather than decrease
the flow of illegal migrants. We also show that they worsen the skill composition of
immigrants.
We derive these results in a simple model of financial contracting between wealth-
constrained migrants and intermediaries. The model is motivated and based on the so-
ciological evidence about the relationship between intermediaries and immigrants, which
we summarize in Section 2. We lay out the model in Section 3 and analyze it in Section
4. In the model, there is a source country from which workers may wish to migrate to
earn higher wages in the host country. In the host country there are an illegal and a
legal sector. Migration costs must be paid upfront, but many potential migrants do not
have enough cash. Wealthy intermediaries/smugglers can provide migrants with funds. If
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the migrant has no collateral, there is only one way to make the debt contract between
intermediary and migrant enforceable. The migrant commits himself to work exclusively
for the intermediary in the source country until the debt is paid back. We will refer to
these contracts as “debt/labor contracts”.
Debt/labor contracts collide with labor law. As long as a migrant is employed in
the illegal sector, the debtholders can enforce the contract through coercion. This is
more difficult when a migrant is legalized, because in the legal sector of the economy, the
migrant receives some protection from the host country’s legal system. Thus, migrants
who move successfully to the legal sector can default on their debt payment. But, there
are costs associated with moving: in the legal sector, migrants become visible to law
enforcement agencies. This exposes them to higher risks of being deported to the source
country. When deportation policies become stricter, migrants are hence less likely to try
moving to the legal sector and there are, then, less defaults on debt repayments. This
implies that financing migrants becomes more rewarding for intermediaries and, hence,
that the flow of migrants financed by debt/labor contracts increases. At the same time,
the net present value of migration for wealthier self-financed migrants decreases, which
reduces their inflow. The net effect on total migration flows is ambiguous, but migrant skill
composition deteriorates unambiguously, given the strong positive correlations between
wealth and skills in developing countries (Piketty, 2000).
Our results hold under the following crucial assumptions. First, we presume that
migrants’ wealth constraints are binding. Our theory therefore applies mainly to long-haul
migration, for instance from China or South Asia to the US or EU, where migration costs
are too high to be paid upfront. It may be less appropriate for short-haul migration, for
instance, between Mexico and the US, or Albania and Italy, although even here, prices for
illegal immigration appear substantial, making it more likely that migrants need external
sources of finance. Second, it is harder to enforce the debt/labor contract when migrants
have successfully moved to the legal sector of the host country. Intermediaries cannot
inflict infinitely costly penalties on defaulting migrants in the legal sector. Third, we
assume that the attempt to obtain legal status in the host country increases an illegal
immigrant’s risks of being deported. It is exactly the fear of deportation that prevents
immigrants from seeking police protection against illegal debt collectors.
Finally, our model assumes rational behavior of migrants and intermediaries, and that
nobody is forced or tricked to enter a debt/labor contract. We do not look at involuntary
slavery, which is an important problem, but is mostly unrelated to international migration
(Bales, 2000). We also distinguish voluntary debt/labor contracts under more or less
perfect information from human trafficking, which involves manipulation of information
2
and kidnapping or coercion.
There is a growing theoretical literature that investigates the effects of host country
policies on illegal immigration. Ethier (1986) introduced a theoretical framework in which
governments optimally use a mix of external and internal enforcement mechanisms, in par-
ticular, employer sanctions to combat illegal immigration. Recent papers have extended
this framework to study the dynamic issues of illegal immigration control. Epstein et al.
(1999) look at the problem of migrants who enter legally and subsequently move into the
illegal sector in order to avoid deportation. Chau (2001) argues that amnesties for illegal
immigrants can help deal with issues of time inconsistency of employer sanctions. Epstein
and Weiss (2001) investigate the strategic interaction of immigrants and host countries
and the optimal design of amnesties. Djajic (1999) argues that stricter immigration con-
trol may be counterproductive as migrants may move into new sectors and new areas,
where new migration networks may form.
Our paper is also building on the model of Ethier (1986), but we do not look at the
dynamic aspects of immigration control. Rather, our contribution is to elaborate the con-
sequences of wealth-constraints and the interaction between migrants and intermediaries
in a theory of illegal migration. The model shows that under these circumstances, stricter
border controls and stricter deportation policies have quite different effects on the flow
and composition of illegal migrants.
In Section 5, we check the empirical consistency of the model with the scarce data
available. Section 6 relaxes some of the simplifying assumptions of the model. We allow
for debt collection in the legal sector of the host country and for general distribution
functions of wealth and skills. This establishes the additional result that stricter border
controls may result in an increase of debt-financed migration. We also sketch models of the
effects of smuggler market power, of vertical separation between smugglers and employers,
and of legal entry of migrants. The main results obtain under these different scenarios.
In Section 7, we look at employer sanctions. We show that there can be complementar-
ities between employer sanctions and deportation policies. Without employer sanctions,
stricter deportation promotes debt-financed migration and decreases self-financed migra-
tion. The total effect is hence ambigious. With intensified employer inspections and
sanctions, deportation policy becomes a more effective tool for decreasing migration. In
Section 8, we discuss normative considerations and how the theory applies to human
trafficking. We also look at parallels from the history of migration through indentured
servitude to the British colonies in the 17th and 18th century. Section 9 concludes.
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2 Intermediaries and migrants: evidence
Most of the available sociological and criminological research on debt-financed migration
concerns illegal migration from China, which appears to be the most important source
country for long-haul illegal migration under wealth constraints. Similar but less well
researched arrangements are also reported for other source countries, for instance, the
Balkans (Business Week, 2000) and India (INS, 1998a), and for illegal migration from
Africa to Europe (Petros, 2005). We here present evidence about (a) information available
to potential migrants, (b) debt/labor contracts between intermediaries and migrants, (c)
the organization of intermediaries, and (d) repayment of debt. The facts presented below
motivate the setting of the model.
Information: There are important and often blurred distinctions between human traf-
ficking and smuggling (see Laczko, 2002, Salt, 2001). The availability of information is
crucial. Young women and children are sometimes tricked or forced into prostitution, but
it appears that most migrants know quite well what to expect (Skeldon, 2000). This con-
cerns not only the costs and non-monetary risks involved with illegal migration, but also
the initially poor living conditions in host countries. Chin and Zhang (2002) show that
most Chinese migrants come from the same few provinces. They benefit from the informa-
tion of relatives and friends who have migrated before. Some pieces of information may be
lacking, but this can only be a transitory phenomenon. O’Rourke and Williamson (1999)
document that even 19th century migrants were well informed about their prospects,
at a time when information travelled by boat. There is little reason to believe that in
the presence of information and telecommunication technologies, informational frictions
would persist for long.
Debt/labor contract: Costs of migration are high, and only few wealthy individuals
or families can afford to self-finance migration. For instance, China-US smuggling fees
reached USD 35,000 in mid 1990s and continued to rise to USD 40-50 thousand since
then (Chin, 1999, Kwong, 1997, 2001, INS, 1998b, New York Times, 2000b). The fees
for passage from China to Europe, or from India to the US are lower but still above USD
20,000 (Business Week, 2000, New York Times, 2000a, INS, 1998a). It is interesting that
within the same route (e.g. Fujian — New York) fees do not seem to vary substantially
across individuals.
A survey of three hundred illegal Chinese immigrants from Fujian province shows
that 90% had to borrow to pay the fee (Chin, 1999). However, many potential migrants
have access to intermediaries who arrange air, sea or ground transport, provide forged
documents and assist in entering the country of destination. Long-haul migration is
organized (Schloenhardt, 1999) in rather similar ways whether migrants come from China,
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Russia (Finckenauer, 2001), or Asia (Business Week, 2000). The migrant may or may not
pay a downpayment of up to 20 percent of the total fee. Smuggler networks arrange the
transfer to the host country, by sea, land or air transport. They also help to enter the
host country. Upon arrival, the migrant is usually kept in a “safe house” or sweatshop
until the debt has been paid back to the smuggler or related businesses. The migrant thus
provides his labor as collateral to the smuggler or its business partners until the debt is
paid back.
Organization of intermediaries: There is agreement that the supply side of the market
for illegal migration consists of an oligopoly of well-organized and profitable networks of
intermediaries (Schloenhardt, 1999, INS, 1998b). Smugglers oftentimes re-invest the re-
turns into the smuggling business (Chin and Zhang, 2002), which indicates that they have
long-term horizons. Reputational concerns appear to keep smugglers and their partners
from treating migrants too badly or from extending their temporary servitude unduly. In
particular, workers are usually set free after the debt has been paid back (Chin, 1999).
Otherwise, new migrants would barely enter contractual relationships with smugglers.
Intermediaries are not always integrated; smugglers may provide finance, but sweat-
shops are often independent customers of the networks’ services. We know rather little
about contractual imperfections between smugglers and employers. Furthermore, the de-
gree of vertical integration is not important for our main argument. Hence, the model
builds on the assumption that intermediaries are integrated. In 6.4 we briefly look at the
vertical structure of intermediaries.
Repayment of debt: Sometimes, relatives of the migrant pay the debt, but usually the
migrant works in businesses associated with the intermediary he used, and the debt is
paid back from his wage. In the case of Fujian Chinese, repayment takes between half a
year and four years with an average of 26 months (Chin, 1999, p. 119). Much of the illegal
migration business appears to follow the spirit of the debt/labor contract quite closely.
3 The model
There are two risk-neutral players, M and I. A potential migrant M (‘he’, occasionally
also called “the worker”) lives in the source country and wishes to migrate to the host
country, which does not permit legal entry. Thus, M needs the services of a smuggler
or intermediary I (‘it’). The migrant is wealth-constrained, while the intermediary has
unlimited access to credit at zero cost. Government policies are modelled in terms of
comparative statics.
Below we posit two assumptions that are crucial for our theory. Their role is further
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discussed and they are relaxed in Sections 6 and Section 7.
Assumption 1 Moving from the illegal to the legal sector of the host country exposes
illegal migrants to higher risks of being deported.
In the basic model, we will assume that the risk of being detected is zero as long as the
migrant stays in the illegal sector. (This makes sense in the absence of systematic employer
checks. In Section 7, we do consider the effect of employer inspections). But, when moving
out of the illegal sector, a migrant becomes more visible for public enforcement agencies,
especially if he wants to obtain a legal job, and protection from smugglers. This exposes
him to a higher risk of being arrested and deported.
Assumption 2 It is harder to enforce the debt/labor contract when migrants have ob-
tained legal status.
This assumption states that being legalized, migrants receive some protection against
coercion and that intermediaries cannot inflict infinitely harsh punishments on defaulting
migrants. In the basic model, we assume for simplicity that there is perfect enforcement
of the debt/labor contract in the illegal sector, while in the legal sector, M is perfectly
protected from coercion by I. In Section 6, we show that the results continue to hold
when allowing for (imperfect) debt collection in the legal sector.
3.1 Timing and migration contract
The parties maximize their respective payoffs UM (migrant) and U I (intermediary), over
two periods. Without loss of generality, the time discount is zero. Figure 1 shows the
timing.
At the beginning of the first period, M makes I a take-it-or-leave-it offer.1 The
contract specifies that I pays the costs of taking M to the illegal sector of the host
country and that M is supposed to make a downpayment p1 that is not exceeding the
migrant’s initial wealth a, and a payment p2 in the second period. The migrant owns no
collateral other than his labor. Hence, the contract stipulates that until p2 is paid, I or
1This implies that the market for smugglers is competitive, a simplifying assumption that is not
important for the results. Section 6 allows for smugglers to have market power, which does not change
the main results. Notice also that the anecdotal evidence presented in Section 2 suggests that there is
competition between smugglers: fees depend on routes (the longer/difficult routes are more expensive).
Also, for any given route, there seems to be no price discrimination across migrants (although this may
be due to asymmetric information between smugglers and migrants, an effect that we do not model).
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its business partners2 own the revenue of M ’s work. This contract puts M in a situation
of temporary, voluntary servitude. The intermediary either accepts or rejects the offer. If
I rejects and M stays (index “s” ) in the source country, the payoffs are:
UMs = a+ ω,
U Is = 0.
Here, ω is M ’s wage in the source country. If I accepts the offer, M migrates. Migration
involves costs of entry into the host country C that are borne by I. These costs C are the
first policy variable of the model: stricter border controls increase C. During the second
period, M either stays in the illegal sector working for I or tries to enter the legal sector.
In the illegal sector of the host country, I appropriates the product ofM ’s work up to p2;
M receives the residual. The total payoff of M when staying in the illegal sector (index
“i”) is thus:
UMi = a− p1 + ew − p2,
where ew is the M ’s wage in the illegal sector. The payoff of I is:
U Ii = p1 + p2 − C.
IfM tries to receive legal status, there are benefits and costs. When the move is successful,
M ’s wage increases from ew to w. As the legal system protects him against coercion by
I, M then reneges on the payment of p2. On the cost side, M increases his risk of
deportation. We normalize the deportation risk in the illegal sector to nil, and label D
the deportation risk when applying for legal status. Probability D is the second policy
variable of the model. Stricter deportation policies increase D.
If M applies for legal status, his payoff is as follows (indices “l” if M receives legal
status, “d” if he is deported to the source country):
UM = UMl ≡ a− p1 + w, with probability 1−D,
UM = UMd ≡ a− p1, with probability D.
If M becomes a legal resident, he defaults on his debt and receives his full legal wage. If
deported, M receives a − p1 : he cannot pay p2 and does not receive any labor income.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that migration and deportation take up allM ’s time
so he forgoes the home country wage ω. One could also consider a model where M would
2It does not matter whether or not the intermediary is integrated with sweatshops. The migrant’s
debt and hence his workforce can be “sold” or “rented” to a business partner. This is modeled in Section
6.
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I accepts 
M defaults on p2, 
enters the legal 
sector  
M is deported,  
receives nothing  
M obtains legal status, 
receives wage w 
M works for I  
in the illegal  
sector
M offers a 
contract p1, p2 
D 
1-D M stays in the source country, receives wage ω 
M pays p1, arrives  
in the host country,  
I receives p1, bears  
cost of migration C 
t=1 t=2 
M pays p2,  
receives wage w~  
I rejects 
Figure 1: Timing.
still be able to earn some wage at home upon deportation; the results would not change
qualitatively.
The respective payoffs for I are:
U Il = U
I
d = p1 − C,
because whenever M attempts to move to the legal sector, I does not receive p2, while,
at this stage, the cost of immigration C has already been sunk.
3.2 Assumptions on wealth and returns to skills
We here make some simplifying assumptions. There are only two types of migrants, high-
and low-skilled, and skill levels are public knowledge. We assume the simplest possible
returns to skills:
ω =
⎧
⎨
⎩
ωH , if a ≥ C
ωL, if a < C
, ωH > ωL;
and
w =
⎧
⎨
⎩
wH , if a ≥ C
wL, if a < C
, wH > wL.
Wealth and skills are perfectly correlated. If M has a ≥ C (a < C) cash, he has high
(low) skills, that is, high-skilled workers have enough cash to finance their migration, while
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low-skilled workers do not. Also, workers who are high- (low-) skilled in one country, are
high- (low-) skilled in the other country as well. In Section 5, we show that our results
hold qualitatively under relaxed assumptions about wealth/skill correlations.
We further assume that in the illegal sector of the host country, the skill premium is
nil. That is, ew does not depend on whether ω = ωH or ω = ωL. More generally, one can
assume that the sensitivity of wage with respect to skills is larger in the legal sector than
in the illegal sector. This leads qualitatively to the same results. The assumption reflects
the fact that irrespective of their skills, illegal workers usually work in low-skilled jobs,
for instance, in the garment industry or restaurants (Kwong, 2001). By definition, illegal
jobs are in such sectors because large and capital-intensive firms cannot operate illegally.
4 Equilibrium migration and policy effects
As a benchmark, we first look at the case in which there is no intermediary. Here, M
must pay the cost of migration upfront, that is, the contract space degenerates to: p1 = C
and p2 = 0. Under our assumptions, a low-skilled M (a < C) cannot migrate because the
liquidity constraint is binding. Furthermore, if
ew − C < ωH , (1)
high-skilled workers (a > C) are not interested in migrating to stay in the illegal sector.
In what follows we assume for simplicity that condition (1) holds. To check whether high-
skilled workers migrate in order to try attaining legal status, we compare (1 −D)UMl +
DUMd with UMs . This leads to a simple condition: migration only occurs if
(1−D)wH > ωH + C. (2)
The left-hand side (LHS) represents the expected wage in the legal sector (with probability
D, M is deported home), and the RHS is a skilled worker’s payoff when staying in the
source country. Summarizing, in this benchmark, only the wealthier individuals migrate,
and the policy effects are as expected. When D or C increase, migration occurs for a
narrower set of parameters a, ew,wi. We look now at the equilibrium with intermediaries
and obtain the first Proposition.
Proposition 1 Assume that condition (1) holds (i.e. the high-skilled workers are not in-
terested in migrating and remaining in the illegal sector). Then, equilibrium is as follows:
1. Low-skilled workers (a < C) migrate if and only if:
a ≥ C −
³ ew − (1−D)wL´ . (3)
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The migrant does not attempt to move to the legal sector. The contract stipulates
p1, p2 such that p1 ≤ a, p2 ≥ 0 and p1 + p2 = C.
2. High-skilled workers (a ≥ C) migrate if and only if (2) holds, and subsequently try
to attain legal status. The contract stipulates p1 = C and p2 = 0.
3. No other migration occurs.
To derive Proposition 1, consider first the migrant’s choice. He decides whether or
not to migrate, and whether or not to try moving from the illegal to the legal sector
subsequently. We thus look at M ’s payoffs for the three outcomes: “stay in the source
country” (UMs = a+ω), “migrate and work in the illegal sector” (UMi = a− p1+ ew− p2),
“migrate and apply for legal status”
h
(1−D)UMl +DUMd = a− p1 + (1−D)w
i
. The
migrant maximizes his payoff subject to satisfying I’s individual rationality constraint
(IR), that is, the expected payoff of I at the time the contract is signed must be larger
or equal zero. For high-skilled migrants this does not cause problems. They pay C
upfront to the intermediary and subsequently try to attain legal status. To use a parallel
from corporate finance, they behave like self-financed entrepreneurs, who migrate if the
net present value of migration exceeds the one of staying home. The case of low-skilled
workers is more complicated. They can only pay a part of the total cost upfront. The
intermediary is hence only willing to finance migration if the migrant does not attempt
to move from the illegal to the legal sector. Put differently, the debt/labor contract is
“incentive-compatible” if and only if ew − p2 ≥ (1−D)wL, i.e.
p2 ≤ ew − (1−D)wL. (4)
Using another parallel from corporate finance, the liquidity-constrained (low-skilled)
migrant behaves like a debt-financed entrepreneur. There is a risk that he defaults on his
debt by trying to attain legal status. The term ew − (1 − D)wL represents the value of
the “pledgeable income” in the debt contract between M and I. Pledgeable income (see
Tirole, 2001) is the maximum amount thatM can credibly commit to pay back; therefore
it is also the maximum amount that I is willing to lend M . Hence, the participation
constraint of the intermediary U I ≥ 0 is satisfied only if a + ew − (1 − D)wL − C ≥ 0,
which is equivalent to (3) stated in the Proposition.
Consider now the effect of changes in policies C and D on immigration of high- and
low-skilled workers.
Proposition 2 Comparative statics.
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1. An increase in C, i.e., stricter border controls, decreases migration of low-skilled
and high-skilled migrants.
2. An increase in D, i.e., stricter deportation and legalization rules, (i) increases mi-
gration of low-skilled workers, and (ii) decreases migration of high-skilled workers.
Proposition 2 entails the main policy implication. Unlike in the benchmark, stricter
border enforcement and stricter deportation policies are not equivalent when wealth con-
straints and intermediaries are taken into account. When C increases, the effects on low
and high-skilled workers are similar — the value of migration decreases. But, when D
increases, the effects are different. The utility of low-skilled upon defaulting on p2 de-
creases. Thus the intermediary’s individual rationality constraint is satisfied more often.
As a result, Condition (3) holds for a larger proportion of the low-skilled, involving that
more of them can migrate. However, condition (2) holds for less of the high-skilled, that
is, less of them migrate. While the total effect on the flow of migrants is ambiguous,
the skill composition deteriorates when D increases. The effect on skill composition of
an increase in C is ambiguous, because it reduces the flow of both high- and low-skilled
migrants.
5 Empirical consistency
The empirical literature on effects of policies on illegal immigration is rather scarce. This
is not surprising as illegal immigration is by definition a clandestine activity and reliable
data are hard to obtain. Also, policy changes do not occur in controlled environments.
They are endogenous to the inflow of migrants, which makes it quite hard to properly
correlate changes in policies with changes in immigrant flows. It is hence not surprising
that rather little is known about the effects of the migration policies. Hanson et al.
(2002b) show that border controls deter immigration to a limited extent and that they
are very costly. Donato et al. (1992) find that the stricter deportation rules and stricter
border controls in the framework of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) had
no significant effect on the flow of migrants. There are a number of studies that look at the
effect of legalization on migrants’ earnings (for instance, Cobb-Clark and Kossoudji, 2002,
Rivera-Batiz, 1999), but there are no studies that investigate how changes in deportation
and legalization policies affect migrant flows, which is our main concern.
While it is impossible to run regressions to test our theory, one could try to calibrate
the model in order to quantify policy effects. However, there are a number of compli-
cations. First, we know very little about the determinants of demand for services of
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smugglers and intermediaries. In our model we have abstracted from the problem of es-
timating demand. The model is set up in partial equilibrium and assumes that workers
migrate provided that the net present value of migration is positive and that they have a
sufficient amount of wealth to pay the down-payment. These two conditions then identify
the range of parameters in which migration is, in principle, possible and to show how this
feasibility set is affected by border controls and deportation policies. These statements
are theoretically precise, but to give empirical predictions, we would need to know de-
mand elasticities. Second, policies chosen by governments are endogenous to the amount
of migrants, their origin and the skill composition.
We therefore cannot generate full-fledged policy simulations; but we can use data from
the US to investigate the empirical consistency of the model: First, our theory hinges on
the idea that intermediaries will only deal with migrants who can be expected to respect
the terms of the contract, i.e., those for whom the contract is incentive-compatible, see
(4). We can check whether this theoretical centerpiece of our model makes empirical
sense. Second, our model is based on the presumption that market transparency protects
migrants from exploitation by intermediaries. We investigate this as well.
For the consistency check of the migrant’s IC constraint, ( ew − p2) ≥ (1 − D)w,3
we proceed as follows. We use various sources about the magnitude of the parameters
( ew, p2, w) and then look at what they imply for the remaining parameter we have no
estimates for: D, the deportation probability migrants face when attempting to become
legalized. Defining Do as the smallest D for which the IC is satisfied, we can write
Do = (p2 + w − ew) /w.
It is useful to first express the wage in the legal sector as w = (1+ l) ew, i.e., as the wage
the migrant receives when staying in the illegal sector plus a premium l associated with
legalization. The empirical equivalent of ew is the NPV of working illegally in the U.S.
We compute the NPV by taking the average minimum wage in the U.S., $6.15 per hour
(U.S. Dept of Labor, 2005). This is a reasonable estimate of the average market wage of
illegal migrants in industries as garment, restaurant or other services. We assume that a
migrant works 45 hours for 52 weeks per year over a period of 40 years.
For l, we use Cobb-Clark and Kossoudji’s (2002) estimates of 14 to 24% legalization
premia. They have looked at Mexican immigrants, and skill premia may be different
for Chinese and other long-haul immigrants, who may have different skill distributions.
Nonetheless, to our knowledge, these are the best available proxies. Debt repayment p2
can be assumed to be between $25,000 and $35,000, as immigrants usually pay around
3Notice that in the basic model, only low-skilled migrants would enter a debt/labor contract, we can
hence omit the index L.
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20% of the total cost of migration as down-payment (Chin, 1999).
We have run simulations using different interest rates. The estimates for Do are in the
range between 7.5% (assuming an interest rate of 3% for the NPV, p2 of $25,000, and zero
legalization premium) and 28% (5%, $35,000, and a legalization premium of 24%). The
scenario that seems most realistic to us yields a Do of 19% (5%, $25,000, 14%). These
estimates seem sensible; moreover, the simulation results show that our theory would be
empirically testable if we had data on the deportation risk of migrants who move out of
the shadow.
As for the second consistency check, it is difficult to judge to what extent the average
smuggling fee (30 to 50 thousand US dollars) reflects some market power. However,
we can use the figures we have collected to check whether — as our theory assumes —
reputational concerns keep smugglers from exploiting migrants “too much” ex post. In
order to do so, notice that the average migrant from China pays back his or her debt
of $25,000 to $35,000 in 26 months; the maximum length of debt repayment we know
about is four years (Chin, 1999). Assuming as before that a migrant works 45 hours per
week and at the minimum wage of $6.15, the value of this work would be around $31,000
for 26 months and $58,000 for four years. Taking into account the value of (low-quality)
food and housing that migrants receive while paying back their debt, these figures do not
indicate much exploitation.
Last but not the least we should verify whether migrants’ acceptance of debt/labor
contracts is rational. Estimates of the GDP per capita in China in terms of purchasing
power parity are in the range of $4000 (e.g. CIA World Factbook, 2005). This implies
that the net present value of migration, even taking into account the wages at home and
the costs of migration, is large — about 180 thousand US dollars.
6 Theoretical robustness, extensions
Our theory builds on two crucial assumptions. First, we assume that when an illegal
immigrant tries to acquire legal status, he increases his risks of being deported. In As-
sumption 1 of the model, we have normalized the deportation risk in the illegal sector
to nil. This is not necessary for the model to hold. It suffices that stricter deportation
policies increase the deportation risk from the legal sector to a larger extent than from
the illegal sector. Otherwise, they would not decrease migrants’ incentives to default on
debt repayments. The effect of stricter border controls and stricter deportation policies
would then be equivalent.
Assumption 1 makes sense for a number of reasons. Moving from the illegal to the legal
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sector makes migrants more visible and vulnerable. They have to register with government
agencies, which increases the risks of deportation. Furthermore, in the absence of raids
on employers, the chances to detect illegal immigrants are very low, unless they get in
contact with the legal sector. Section 7 models work-site inspections explicitly.
The second major assumption is that debt/labor contracts cannot be enforced in the
legal sector. In subsection 6.1 we show that our model is robust to allowing for the
possibility of debt collection in the legal sector. In 6.2, we sketch a generalized model
that does not hinge on assumptions concerning the correlation of skills and wealth, or on
specific distributions. In 6.3, we briefly look at direct legal entry into the host country, and
in 6.4 at the allocation of bargaining power between workers, smugglers and employers of
illegal migrants.
6.1 Debt collection in the legal sector
According to Assumption 2, debt p2 can only be collected in the illegal sector. Assume
now that there is some possibility of debt collection, even if M transits successfully to
the legal sector. As the legal system of the host country provides protection for M, debt
collection is then more costly for the intermediary. One could model default and potential
debt collection betweenM and I as an explicit game. Here we focus on checking robustness
only. Hence, it is sufficient to look at a reduced form and to simply assume that debt is
collected in the legal system with probability ξ ∈ [0, 1].
Then, omitting index L at the legal-sector wage w, M’s incentive-compatibility con-
straint becomes less restrictive:
( ew − p2) ≥ (1−D) (w − ξp2) .
The pledgeable-income constraint (4) is rewritten as follows:
p2 ≤
ew − (1−D)w
1− (1−D)ξ .
The wealth constraint of the migrant is still p1 ≤ a, and the intermediary’s participation
constraint is:
p1 + p2 ≥ C.
Adding up the three inequalities, we find that debt-financed migration is feasible when-
ever:
C ≤ a+
ew − (1−D)w
1− (1−D)ξ . (5)
The right-hand side of (5) increases in D, because w > ew ≥ ewξ. Hence, our main
result remains intact: stricter deportation policies facilitate debt-financed migration.
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Further, the intermediary does not let the migrant go to collect debt from their wage
in the legal sector if the following holds:4
a+ w(1−D)ξ < C. (6)
That is, for ξ sufficiently low such that (6) is satisfied, stricter deportation policies increase
migration. Conversely, if (6) does not hold, I would let M go to work in the legal sector.
Given the well-documented debt-labor contracts between intermediaries and migrants,
this seems to be rarely the case.
6.2 Generalized model
We now consider a continuum of workers and skills; we also drop the assumption of perfect
correlation between skills and wealth. These changes are useful to check robustness of the
comparison of stricter border controls vs stricter deportation policies. They also generate
an additional result: stricter border controls may induce illegal migrants to move from
self-financed migration to debt/labor contracts.
Assume that the source country is populated with a continuum of workers whose mass
is normalized to 1. The workers differ in three dimensions: home wage ω, wealth a, and
wage in the legal sector w. All three parameters are likely to be correlated with the
skills of workers; therefore they should be positively correlated with each other. We do
not make any specific assumptions about the joint distribution of the parameters; rather
we allow for some joint density function f(ω, a,w) on R3+. For simplicity, we maintain
the assumption that there is no skill premium in the illegal sector ( ew is the same for all
workers). Relaxing this assumption would not change the results, but would generate
economically uninteresting distinctions.
The analysis is similar to that of Section 4. Lemma 1 (in the Appendix) states the
precise expressions for different types of migrant flows. Figure 2 plots these flows as a
function of migrant wages w, and initial wealth a, given the wage at home ω. The left-hand
side graph represents the case of relatively skilled workers for whom ω + C > ew, i.e., the
wage in the home country plus the cost of migration outweighs the income from working
in the host country’s illegal sector. Such workers will only migrate in order to transit
to the legal sector; therefore only self-financed migration is feasible (a > C).5 Migration
pays off whenever (1−D)w − C > ω or, equivalently, w > (ω + C)/(1−D).
4We thank a referee for pointing to this issue.
5As the IC of these migrants is never satisfied, intermediaries cannot break even when doing business
with them.
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Figure 2: Migration flows in a generalized model as a function of wage at home ω, wealth
a, wage in the legal sector w, and wage in the illegal sector ew.
The right-hand side graph represents relatively low-skilled workers with ω + C < ew.
Compared to the basic model, new cases emerge when we drop the assumption of perfect
correlation between skills and wealth: Relatively low-skilled workers may be sufficiently
wealthy (a ≥ C) to migrate without engaging in a debt/labor contract. Depending on
their wages in the legal sector, they either try to transit to the legal sector (northeast of
point B), or they stay in the illegal sector (southeast of point B).
For those who are wealth-constrained (a < C), the line EB represents the incentive
constraint (the pledgeable income equals the amount borrowed C − a). Notice that the
intermediary only finances wealth-constrained workers with relatively low skills (below
E’B’). If the migrant can earn too high a wage in the legal sector, he will default on debt,
and the pledgeable income is not sufficient to cover the intermediary’s costs.
Comparative statics results can be found in Lemma 2 in the Appendix. First, we look
at the impact of stricter border enforcement policies (an increase from C to C 0). Such
a policy change has effects on: (a) the migration flow of high-skilled workers for whom
ω + C > ew; (b) the migration flow of low-skilled workers; (c) the proportion of workers
with ω+C > ew, who only migrate to work in the legal sector, and hence must self-finance
migration.
Effect (c) is obvious. Effect (a) is also straightforward. In Fig. 2, left, point A
moves northeast and migration decreases. Effect (b) is plotted on the left-hand side of
Fig. 3. First, the increase in C directly reduces the flow of self-financed low-skilled
migrants. Second, it shifts line EB to the right; this reduces the flow of debt-financed
low-skilled. Third, there is an interesting new effect. Area II (below EB) depicts the flow
of workers moving from self-financed migration to debt/labor contracts when C increases.
Their wealth does not suffice anymore to pay the cost of migration themselves, but the
pledgeable income is large enough for the intermediary to break even.
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Figure 3: Comparative statics for the low-skilled workers (ω+C < ew). The left-hand side
graph illustrated the effect of an increase from C to C 0; the right hand-side graph shows
the impact of an increase in D.
Notice also that while an increase in C reduces the flow of all types of migrants, the
effect on skill composition is ambiguous.
Stricter deportation policies (an increase of D to D0) do not affect condition (1).
Thus, there is no shift between the groups of workers for whom ω+C > ew or ω+C < ew.
Migration of the highly skilled decreases (point A, Fig. 2a, moves northeast). The graph
on the right side of Fig. 3 shows the effect on low-skilled. The net present value of
migration to the legal sector decreases. Thus, the wealthier low-skilled workers prefer
migrating and staying in the illegal sector, rather than trying to transit to the legal sector
(area IV).6 However, when moving to the legal sector becomes less attractive, it is also
easier for the intermediary to recover its investment — the pledgeable income of wealth-
constrained workers increases. Hence, a greater number of low-skilled workers migrate
(area III). As more low-skilled and less high-skilled migrate, migrant skill composition
deteriorates.
These comparative statics suggest that the interaction of policies is more subtle than
the simple model would suggest. In the framework of the simple model, there is a quick
solution to stop migration through debt/labor contracts without changing total inflow of
workers. The government could decrease D, and as total immigration increases (owing
to more high-skilled immigration), it could increase C to reduce overall migration to the
original level. The general model, however, shows that this policy package would fail,
because an increase in C creates new debt/labor immigrants.
The following proposition summarizes the above discussion.
Proposition 3 Effects of policy variables in the generalized model.
6Notice that a similar effect is discussed in Epstein et al. (1999).
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1. An increase in C reduces migrant flows and has ambiguous effects on the skill com-
position of migrants.
2. An increase in D has ambiguous effects on migrant flows and reduces the average
skills of migrants.
6.3 Legal entry
We have only considered illegal immigration above, but the results are robust to allowing
for the direct legal entry. In reality, there are limited possibilities of direct legal entry
into the US, for instance, through lotteries, or for very wealthy immigrants: Section
203(b)(5) of the US Immigration and Nationality Act provides permanent resident status
for immigrants who invest USD 1 million in the US economy.7 Suppose that the cost of
direct legal entry is L. Wealthy high-skilled workers compare the utility associated with
illegal migration and a subsequent attempt to legalize, a− C + w(1 −D), to the utility
of direct legal entry, a− L+ w. Direct legal entry is therefore chosen if:
w > (L− C)/D and a > L.
Therefore the migrants with highest skills and largest wealth will immigrate via direct
legal entry. However, types with intermediate wealth and skills choose illegal entry with
a plan to acquire legal status after arriving at destination.
6.4 Monopoly power and the role of employers
In the model, migrants have full bargaining power. This has allowed us to identify the
largest set of workers for whom migration is feasible (see the comment in Section 5). In
reality, intermediaries may have some market power. Furthermore, unlike in our model,
smugglers and employers may not maximize joint profit, but they may be vertically sepa-
rated. This subsection provides an idea how these issues can be handled in the framework
of our model.
For simplicity, we keep the assumption of symmetric information and assume that the
intermediary is a monopoly. This implies that I, rather than M has all the bargaining
power. Suppose also that there are firms who employ the migrant in the illegal sector.
They are separate from the intermediary, and it is realistic to assume perfect competition
between employers. The smuggler collects p1 fromM and sells the debt claim of p2 to the
7http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/residency/investment.htm, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Service.
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employer. If the employer expects the worker to stay in the illegal sector, the employer
will be willing to pay p2 to the smuggler. Otherwise the employer will not pay anything.
Worker M has no bargaining power in the illegal sector, and his outside option of a
transit to the competitive legal sector provides a payoff of (1 − D)w. The employer’s
payoff is therefore ew− (1−D)w. This is also the maximum amount the employer would
want to pay for the debt claim. Hence p2 ≤ ew − (1−D)w, very much like in the simple
model above. As I’s rent is p1 + p2 − C must be positive, and the financial constraint
implies p1 ≤ a, we have the same constraint for the feasibility of debt-financed migration
as before: ew − (1−D)w + a ≥ C.
The smuggler will set p1 to makeM ’s participation constraint a−p1+(1−D)w−ω ≥ 0
binding. In contrast to the model in Section 3, all rents are now appropriated by I.
However, the effect of policy variable D is the same. When D increases, I decreases p1 to
keep workers interest in migrating (i.e., −p1 + (1−D)w is kept constant). However, the
increase in D involves that ew− (1−D)w+ a ≥ C holds for a smaller number of workers.
The sketch of analysis above is only a first step for studying vertical integration and
separation, and the issue of market power between smugglers and employers. More in-
teresting trade-offs may be generated when one introduces asymmetric information, con-
tractual incompleteness, and specific investments. Yet, given how little evidence there is
on the relationship between smugglers and employers, we prefer not to speculate on those
issues in this paper.
7 Employer sanctions
In the U.S., work-site inspections are rarely carried out and employer sanctions tend to
have little bite. According to Hanson et al. (2002a), in 1990, less than eight percent
of INS enforcement manpower was devoted to worksite inspections, and less then one
percent of the 1.5 million apprehensions were made at worksites. A report of the U.S.
Department of Justice (1996) stated that:
“[e]ven if the illegal alien work force in the U.S. were to remain static at 2
million and INS were to meet its removal targets, INS worksite removals would
equal less then 0.1 percent of the illegal alien work force and could be expected
to have a statistically insignificant effect on the remaining work force.”
Although government officials occasionally announce a tougher stance on employers,
little appears to have changed since then. The situation is similar in the UK. The IOM
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(2003) reports that the number of UK employers who were fined under the “Asylum and
Immigration Act” of 1996 were nil in 1997, one in 1998, nine in 1999, and 23 in 2000.
The situation is different in continental Europe. According to Martin and Miller
(2000), sanctions in France and Germany are much stricter than in the US. In France,
for instance, employers can be penalized to up to 1000 times the minimum wage (1286
Euros in 2004), while in the U.S. the maximum fine is $10,000. Germany spends about
five times more per worker than the US to prevent the employment of illegal foreign
workers. Germany has about 1,500 labor market inspectors for a labor market with
about 40 million workers, in 1994, the US had 245 INS worksite investigators (and an
additional 900 Department of labor inspectors) for about 130 million workers. In France
and Germany, labor inspectors can inspect any site without prior notification. In the US
they must give advance notice of three days.
Given high unemployment in many European countries, it can be expected that em-
ployer sanctions and inspections will be intensified. The model can be readily extended
to take into account employer sanctions. They have similar effects as increases in border
enforcement. Furthermore, we have conjectured before that stricter deportation policies
can only have deterrent effects on illegal migrants if raids on employers of illegal migrants
are intensified. We here show formally the existence of such complementarities.
Suppose first that in the illegal sector, there is a probability E of a raid. Then, the
worker is deported to the source country, and the employer is fined for F dollars. In this
case worker automatically defaults on debt.
The worker’s payoff in the illegal sector is therefore:
UMi = a− p1 + (1− E) ( ew − p2) .
The payoff of I (denoting the coalition of smuggler and employer) has a payoff of:
U Ii = p1 + (1−E) p2 − C −EF.
The worker’s incentive compatibility constraint becomes:
a− p1 + (1− E) ( ew − p2) ≥ a− p1 + (1−D)w.
Adding up the liquidity constraint p1 ≤ a, we obtain p1 + p2 (1−E) ≤ a + ew (1−E) −
w(1−D). Therefore the participation constraint U Ii ≥ 0 implies:
a ≥ C − ( ew − (1−D)w) +E( ew + F ). (7)
Raids E and harshness of punisment F have similar effects on debt-financed migration
as C. The stricter these employer sanctions, the lower debt-financed migration. Yet, the
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impact of D is unaffected. Stricter deportation policies facilitate debt-financed migration
(holding border enforcement C, employer raids E, and employer sanctions F constant).8
Consider now a more sophisticated and probably a more realistic setting in which there
exist complementarities between D and E. Assume that the same deportation policy is
applied to both those applying for legal status and those caught in work-site inspections.
Then the probability of being detected and sent home associated with a job in the illegal
sector is E = bED, and the policymaker chooses bE rather than E. The pledgeable income
becomes
³
1− bED´ ew − (1−D)w. Hence debt-financed migration occurs if:
a ≥ C + bED( ew + F )− ew + (1−D)w. (8)
In this framework, the effect of stricter deportation policies on the pledgeable income
− ew bE + w is weaker, but it remains positive. As the legal sector wage w > ew ≥ bE ew,
stricter deportation policies still facilitate migration.
Proposition 4 In a model with employer sanctions, the impact of policy is as follows
1. Stricter border enforcement C and stricter employer sanctions bE decrease illegal
debt-financed migration.
2. Stricter deportation policy D increases illegal debt-financed migration.
3. Stricter employer sanctions bE weaken the positive effect of deportation policy D on
debt-financed migration.
The last statement essentially emphasizes the complementarities between policies.
Without employer sanctions, stricter deportation promotes debt-financed migration and
decreases self-financed migration, so the total effect may be positive or negative. However,
the stronger the employer sanctions, the less important is the positive effect of deportation
policy on debt-financed migration. Hence, deportation policies become a more effective
tool for decreasing migration. This result is in line with Ethier (1986) and more recent
work, for instance, Chau (2001) who argue that policy instruments should be combined
to be effective.
8 Further implications
Our model can provide some insights about the effect of amnesties on decisions to mi-
grate. The existing literature on amnesties (e.g. Chau, 2001, and Epstein and Weiss,
8If D and E are changed together (e.g. increase by the same amount), then the stricter policies do
deter migration as long as the employer sanctions are strict enough (F > ew − w).
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2001) does not consider financial constraints. Therefore, since each amnesty raises ex-
pectations for future amnesties, it results in higher incentives to migrate. This is true
in the model when only self-financed migration is considered. Indeed, if ex ante both
migrants and intermediaries anticipate a sufficiently high chance of amnesty (lower D,
in terms of our model), then high-skilled migration should increase (Part 2 of Proposi-
tion 2). However, once one takes into account the impact of expected amnesties on the
debt/labor contract, a countervailing effect arises. Anticipating that immigrants may
obtain legal status through amnesty, intermediaries will refuse to lend. Hence, more of
the wealth-constrained migrants stay in the source country, which decreases low-skilled
migration. Thus, an expected amnesty may either increase or decrease total immigration,
but it improves the skill composition of incoming migrants.
Our model takes a positive perspective. We abstain from welfare statements as the
welfare analysis is very complicated. It is in the interest of wealth-constrained immigrants
to engage in debt/labor contracts, because they could not migrate otherwise.9 Lenient
deportation policies can hence reduce the joint welfare of immigrants and the host country.
However, this does not take into account a number of external effects: (i) the negative
impact of high-skilled emigration on the source country (‘brain drain’); (ii) the impact
of immigration on the low-skilled domestic workers whose retraining is costly and take
time10; (iii) the impact of lenient deportation policies on the stock of illegal immigrants
who have already entered the country; (iv) the ethical concerns that sweatshops and
illegal immigration raise, and the risk that the law enforcement system is corrupted. The
welfare analysis becomes even more involved in the case of immigration amnesties which
are hard to study in a static framework.
We have throughout the paper made a distinction between human smuggling, which
assumes rational contracting between intermediary and migrants, and trafficking that in-
volves manipulation and coercion. While we want to be careful to expand the model’s
reach to trafficking, it seems that more lenient deportation policies are more desirable,
because they help trafficking victims and reduce the profitability of trafficking networks.
While the ex ante analysis of our model does not hold for trafficking victims, the profitabil-
ity of the trafficking industry depends to a similar extent on the strictness of deportation
rules as the one of the smuggling industry. Hence there are similar implications, provided
9In our model, servitude is voluntary. Stricter deportation policies that facilitate debt-labor migration
therefore benefit immigrants. As argued in Genicot (2002), it is quite hard to construct an economic
argument where voluntary bonded labor is against the worker’s interest, unless one introduces externalities
in credit markets.
10These workers do not want low-skilled immigration, but may benefit from high-skilled immigration,
see Zimmermann (1994).
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that the victims of trafficking have some possibility to escape and contact the police. Our
logic does not apply otherwise.
While illegal migration is a relatively new phenomenon by historical standards, it bears
resemblance with the past. Past migration waves were driven by income differentials in
similar ways as current migration. It has always been expensive to migrate, and migrants
have always been subject to financial constraints.11 What distinguishes the present wave of
migration from the previous ones is that, nowadays, host country governments undertake
efforts to deter rather than to encourage migration.
There are nonetheless striking parallels to indentured servitude. Between one half and
two thirds of all white immigrants coming to the Northern American British Colonies
between 1630 and the Revolution came as indentured servants. To finance the passage
to the colonies, they committed their workforce for a certain period of time (Galenson,
1984). Initially, a vertically integrated company provided finance and transportation,
and owned workshops employing the immigrants. Later, this industry converged to a
structure similar to the one observed in the modern world; the company only provided
finance and transportation but then sold the debt claim, and hence migrants’ workforce
to independent employers in the colonies. Debtholders respected the terms of contracts
and set workers free after they had paid their debt. Usually this took three to seven
years. Many indentured servants tried to run away, but as the contracts between mi-
grants and debtholders were fully legal, captured servants were penalized and sent back
to the debtholders. This made sense since the government was interested in an inflow
of cheap labor. In terms of our theory, the host country could not further decrease the
cost of migration C (it was dictated by high relative transportation costs rather then by
policy-driven barriers), so the only way to increase immigration was to enforce debt/labor
contracts and sustain indentured servitude as a labor market institution.
The main difference between indentured servitude and modern sweatshop employment
is that today’s host countries do want to combat illegal migration. Our model shows,
however, that by applying stricter immigration policies, they may contribute to the spread
of debt/labor contracts. First, stricter border and visa policies increase cost of entry and
make financial constraints binding for a greater number of potential immigrants. Second,
stricter deportation policies help enforce debt/labor contracts in a way similar to that of
the British colonies in the 17th and 18th centuries.
11See Chiswick and Hatton (2002) and O’Rourke and Williamson (1999) for an overview on current
and past migration.
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9 Concluding remarks
The rather poor data situation does not yet allow to carry out a comprehensive empirical
evaluation of immigration policies. There is thus scope for theoretical analysis to better
understand the effects of different policies, and the costs that may be associated with
them. We have presented a theory of illegal immigration in which the interaction between
migrants and intermediaries is crucial.
In this realistic framework stricter border controls and stricter deportation policies do
not affect the flow and composition of illegal immigration in similar ways. While stricter
border controls reduce migrant flows and have ambiguous effects on skill composition,
stricter deportation policies have ambiguous effects on flows, but unambiguously worsen
skill composition. We have also shown that stricter border controls may induce migrants
to move from self-financed migration to temporary servitude, and that there can be com-
plementarities between deportation policies and worksite inspections. These effects arise
in a straightforward way once financial constraints and the role of intermediaries are
considered, and they seem to be in line with the existing empirical evidence.
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Appendix: Comparative Statics in the Generalized Model
Straightforward calculations yield the following Lemmas.
Lemma 1 Equilibrium migration flows under the assumptions of Section 6.2 are as fol-
lows.
1. Inflow of migrants, financed through a debt/labor contract, staying in the illegal
sector:
nidebt =
CZ
0
da
ew−CZ
0
dω
ew+a−C
1−DZ
0
f(ω, a,w)dw.
2. Inflow of self-financed migrants, trying to move to the legal sector:
nlself =
∞Z
C
da
∞Z
0
dω
∞Z
max{ew,ω+C}
1−D
f(ω, a, w)dw.
3. Inflow of self-financed migrants, staying in the illegal sector:
niself =
∞Z
C
da
ew−CZ
0
dω
ew
1−DZ
0
f(ω, a,w)dw.
Indices “debt” and “self” represent sources of financing; indices “l” and “i” stand for
legal and illegal sector.
Lemma 2 Comparative statics.
1. An increase in C decreases both legal and illegal migration, decreases self-financed
migration. The effect on debt-financed migration is ambigous.
∂nlself
∂C
< 0;
∂
³
nidebt + niself
´
∂C
< 0;
∂
³
niself + nlself
´
∂C
< 0.
2. An increase in D decreases legal migration, decreases self-financed migration, but
increases illegal migration, both debt-financed and self-financed.
∂nlself
∂D < 0;
∂(nlself+niself)
∂D > 0;
∂nidebt
∂D > 0;
∂niself
∂D > 0.
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